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The Rediff Special/ Professor Stephen P Cohen

America's engagement in the Kashmir dispute needs to be raised several notches

Kashmir is widely regarded by senior US officials and intelligence analysts as the world's most likely flashpoint for a nuclear war. The conflict over Kashmir dates back to 1947-48, when Britain departed from South Asia, leaving behind the dominions of India and Pakistan. The hundreds of residual princely states were to choose between joining India or Pakistan, taking into account geographical proximity as well as the religious makeup of the state's population. The Hindu ruler of the largely Muslim states of Jammu and Kashmir toyed with declaring independence until raiders from Pakistan invaded his territory, leading him to opt for India and its military protection.

At the time, New Delhi said Kashmir's accession would be conditional, promising the United Nations it would hold a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people. To date that vote has not been held, as India argued that Pakistan first had to vacate its portion of the state and, more recently, that its 1972 Simla Agreement with Pakistan provided a new mechanism for settling the dispute. Then, as now, a plebiscite probably would result in a vote for independence -- an outcome opposed by both Pakistan and India.

Wars have been waged over Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965, with additional skirmishes in 1971. The Kashmir crisis took a new turn in 1989 when a popular separatist movement challenged Indian rule in the prized Valley. This raised Pakistani hopes that India could be pressured into serious negotiations over Kashmir, ultimately resulting in a war in Kargil -- with more than a thousand casualties -- in the summer of 1999.

What makes Kashmir such a difficult issue is that it is not only about contested territory and populations but because it also touches upon competing national identities: India as a secular state, Pakistan as an Islamic one. Settling the Kashmir problem means, ultimately, dealing with these larger issues, a task that is well beyond the reach of any outside power.

There has been no broad US initiative on Kashmir since the early 1960s. For years the situation was seen as both intractable and marginal to American interests. This lack of interest in Kashmir satisfied the Indian government, which strongly opposed any outside intervention, but it disappointed Pakistan. But Pakistanis have proved even more reluctant than Indians to discuss solutions other than a plebiscite leading to accession to Pakistan.

America's engagement in the dispute over Kashmir needs to be raised several notches, while avoiding intruding too far into an issue that can only be settled by the parties involved. The following is a guide to such an engagement.

First, US officials should continue to publicly exhort both countries to resume their dialogue on Kashmir.

Second, Washington should privately but actively work towards a resumption of talks, perhaps by serving as an informal channel of communication between Delhi and Islamabad.

Third, there are aspects of the Kashmir conflict that are more amenable to solution than the core problem, the final status of the Valley and its inhabitants. These include a reduction of incidents across the Line of Control, withdrawal of forces from the frozen wastes of the Siachen Glacier, and improving economic ties between both parts of Kashmir. The US can provide its good offices, and even technical assistance that may facilitate agreement on these issues.

Fourth, a special American co-ordinator for Kashmir should be appointed. The co-ordinator should not attempt to mediate the dispute, but he or she could harmonise American policies with those of other states, serve as a clearing house for ideas and policies, and promote Track II diplomacy -- unofficial but informed dialogues between Indians and Pakistanis. If the American experience in other regions is a guide, this co-ordinator's role will extend over several administrations: Just the appointment would convey the impression that a process leading to the resolution, or at least amelioration, of the Kashmir problem has begun.

Professor Stephen P Cohen, the well-known expert on South Asia, is a senior fellow at the US-based Brookings Institution. This commentary is reproduced from the Brookings Policy Brief, with Professor Cohen's permission.

PART I: Need for a fresh look at US policies in South Asia

PART III: India may not be China, but neither is it an insignificant 'Third World' State

PART IV: The question, 'should Bill Clinton visit Pakistan,' is the wrong one

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