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India in the American national security strategy

Despite rhetoric about India and the United States being "natural partners" and "natural allies" as the two largest democracies in the world, the two countries have really been, in the words of American scholar Denis Kux, "estranged democracies".

Mutual bickering and distrust have clouded their relationship. Even after the end of the Cold War, the primary thrust of American diplomacy was to "cap, roll back and end" India's nuclear weapons capabilities. And to achieve this purpose the non-proliferation warriors and compulsive India-baiters like Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel were quite prepared to condone, overlook, and even rationalise Pakistan's support for cross-border terrorism and use Jammu & Kashmir as an issue to pressurise India.

Things have substantially changed after we asserted our autonomy in nuclear matters with the Pokhran tests of 1998 and Pakistan displayed its recklessness with its Kargil misadventure. The new 'National Security Strategy of the United States' presented by President George Bush reflects the winds of change that appear to be removing the old cobwebs in American minds about India.

The report entitled Global Trends 2015 published by the Central Intelligence Agency last year, before the cataclysmic events of September 11, was the first manifestation of changed thinking in the corridors of power in the USA. The report had described India as an "unrivalled regional power" with "a large military including naval and nuclear capabilities and a dynamic and growing economy". It predicted that Pakistan would be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on international financial assistance. It added that Pakistan would not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics, and ethnic feuds. It expected that by 2015, the Pakistani central government's writ would be confined to Punjab and urban hubs like Karachi.

Such assessments led to President Bush expressing his determination to build a new relationship with a vibrantly democratic and economically resurgent India. The war on terrorism in Afghanistan and its consequent extension to Pakistan naturally raised questions in Indian minds on whether President Bush was being forced to backtrack on his earlier assertions about India and revert to the old "India-Pakistan equation syndrome" as many of the mandarins in the state department would dearly like. The Bush National Security Strategy addresses such misgivings.

President Bush has asserted that the United States is now threatened by "shadowy networks of individuals" penetrating open societies with new technologies and by enemies seeking weapons of mass destruction capabilities. He said that "as a matter of common sense and self-defence America will act against such threats before they are formed".

The new strategy envisages action against any terrorist organisation of global reach or state sponsor of terrorism that attempts to acquire or use WMD or their precursors. Such action would be for "defending the United States and the American people and our interests at home and abroad, by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders".

The new Bush Doctrine therefore calls not just for "pre-emptive" strikes, but "preventive" strikes to protect American security interests. It adds: "We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defence." Referring to Islamic countries, the new strategy voices support for "moderate and modern governments, especially in the Muslim world".

The Bush Doctrine has an extensive agenda for "cooperative action with other main centres of Global Power". The NATO partners are naturally the primary focus of attention in this effort. Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and New Zealand are identified as key players in the Asia-Pacific region. Optimism is also voiced on the relationship with Russia following the establishment of the "NATO-Russia Council".

The American objective is to develop a co-operative framework of relations with the Russians, with Russia's integration in a "Euro-Atlantic community". Much will, however, depend on the Bush Administration reaching an understanding with the Russians on the American role in the former Soviet republics. The Russians would obviously not relish American insensitivity towards their vital interests in their immediate neighbourhood.

The Chinese are not going to be too enthusiastic about the new American strategy. The document refers to Taiwan's democratic traditions in positive terms. The United States will seek to promote a "stable, peaceful, and prosperous" Asia-Pacific and also welcome a "strong, peaceful, and prosperous China". It, however, cautions China against "following an outdated path" to acquire "advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbours". It advises China to take the path of "political freedom" for its people and asserts that Taiwan, human rights, and non-proliferation remain areas of "profound disagreements". Thus, the Bush Doctrine seeks to engage China, even while expressing concern about its possible future role.

The misgivings that have been voiced by India about the directions that American policy appeared to be taking in response to the terror attacks of September 11 have also been addressed. These misgivings have arisen because Colin Powell and his mandarins have continuously sought to view the relationship with India in the post-September 11 period through a Pakistani prism.

The Bush Doctrine, however, states: "The United States has transformed its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom, protected by representative government. India is moving towards greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean, and in creating a strategically stable Asia."

The Bush administration acknowledges that differences with India remain on India's nuclear and missile programmes and the pace of economic reform in India. But such differences will not be allowed to compromise the "strong strategic partnership" that it seeks with India --- a country that is described as a "growing world power with which we have common strategic interests".

The Bush Doctrine naturally refers to regional disputes and emphasizes the need for India and Pakistan to settle their "disputes". Nowhere does the strategy document contain the dreaded "K" word! The only reference to Pakistan states: "With Pakistan, our relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war on terror and move towards building a more open and tolerant society." It is thus apparent that in the perception of the strategic establishment in Washington, India is a vibrant democracy with a growing economy, while Musharraf's Pakistan is a problem child that has to be encouraged to behave and reform itself.

It would, however, be naïve to presume that this document is suddenly going to change the state department's propensity to stick to its old ways. The approach of the state department to issues like India's military co-operation with Israel and transfers of high technology remains rooted in past policies. While President Bush has handled the recent tensions in India-Pakistan relations with a determination that Pakistan should "permanently" end its support for cross-border terrorism, there is no dearth of voices that seek to dilute this policy and make excuses for the "difficulties" of their favourite military dictator to fulfil promises he made to the president of the United States.

Our diplomacy with the United States will, therefore, have to be conducted with firmness, tact, and imagination, if we are to see that bilateral relations proceed along the path enunciated by President Bush. We will remain relevant and respected only if we translate the hope of an 8 per cent growth rate into a reality.

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