Commentary/Varsha Bhosle

Let's make mayhem

It's been said that I'm very poorly informed on nuclear debates and the powerful coalition within and outside the US government which is making a convincing case for radical changes in nuclear policies. Also, it is very simplistic of me to argue that we ought to go nuclear, since "India does not have the political will, economic resources or technological width and depth" to exercise the nuclear option (ergo, India must endorse the CTBT). Too, since pacifists cannot grasp what security objectives can be met by going nuclear, India must bow to international pressure… The indignation of the nonviolent/secular never fails to amuse me – it's always so much more hostile than us jingoists'. Not to speak of naïve.

Nuclear debates have been going on since day one – which we can take as July 16, 1945, when the US had nearly concluded the program (code-named Manhattan Project) to produce the atomic bomb under the aegis of theoretical physicist J Robert Oppenheimer. The Nuclear Age began on a silent stretch of desert in Alamogordo, New Mexico, when, at the moment of reckoning – the first test – Oppenheimer chanted from the Bhagvad Gita: "Death am I, the great destroyer of worlds…" (Kaalosmi lokakshayakrit pravruddho). Just three weeks later, the A-bomb was detonated over Hiroshima. While we still sit limply droning Raghupati Raghav Raja Ram, fifty years ago, America had already digested, acted upon and benefited from a vital element of the Gita.

In the three-day hiatus between the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, delegates of the US, UK, USSR and France met in London to establish a military tribunal to try Nazi leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity: At the Nuremberg trials, the principle of individual accountability was upheld against the defeated Axis powers. But, not a word was said, then or later, on whether or not the principle applied to the holocaust of Japanese civilians. That, my friends, is realpolitik. The winner of the1995 Nobel Peace Prize, Joseph Rotblat, has been an anti-nuke campaigner since his days as a scientist on the Manhattan Project, and Oppenheimer himself opposed the development of the H-bomb… The pertinent question is not whether such debates exist – but if they have achieved anything significant over the past fifty years.

It's true that a coalition is making a case for radical changes in nuclear policy. Recently, retired Generals Lee Butler and Andrew J Goodpaster came out forcefully and lucidly against nukes. They were listened to because of their former positions: General Butler had been the Commander-in-Chief of the US Strategic Command, in which capacity he was responsible for all US Air Force and Navy nuclear forces which support the security objectives of strategic defense; and General Goodpaster had advised presidents from Eisenhower through Clinton, while also having served as director of the joint staff, and commander of NATO forces. (Their comments made the news for a couple of weeks earlier this year; that's all) What I'd like to know is: Where were their irenic consciences while they were drawing their paychecks for over five decades? Or are they still performing a patriotic duty by dissuading us? Old tigers changing stripes…

From another angle, which standing officer in the US military would want to jeopardise his career by recommending the only change that makes sense – i e, total nuclear disarmament? The reduction of stockpiled weapons by the nuclear powers has little meaning for India. For even if the Big Five bring down their inventory to a 100 nukes, the use of just ten would be more than enough to change and even determine the outcome of a war.

It's been said that I don't understand the no-first-use doctrine, either: Apparently, "China has pledged never to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" and has "so far stood by its pledge". I've got news for you: NO nuclear power has agreed to a n-f-u guarantee in case of conflict with even a non-nuclear state. But let's assume I'm wrong, and that China has pledged it. Are we to now trust past aggressors of India in defence matters? (Check out the item on intrusions into Himachal Pradesh.) Whether or not China may strike first with nuclear weapons in the course of conventional war is academic: As long as China has nuclear weapons, no strategist can plan for a war based on the assumption that the enemy will not use such weapons – no matter what the pledges. That, too, is realpolitik.

Why should India have to depend on assurances from China? Notice that none of the big boys themselves are satisfied with promises from anybody else: They wanted an NPT; they got it. They wanted a CTBT; they got it. They want a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; no doubt, they'll get it. The flower-power mentality of most Indians – and thank god, not of bureaucrats like Arundhati Ghosh – will have us offer even our nether cheeks for more. China may have pledged not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it may have stood by its pledge "so far". Thanks. But what if Beijing decides to make an exception…?

In the late 1940s, when the nuclear race began in earnest, the technological capabilities of the superpowers were not even comparable to ours today. A country which had its first nuclear test in 1974, and which has since demonstrated missile-making capability (Prithvi, Agni, and rumours of a "Surya"), sent satellites into orbit with its own launchers (PSLV), and developed its own super-computer, surely has the width and depth to exercise the nuclear option! And what's this "exercising of the nuclear option", anyway? One can have broken down kits ready for assembly (which the rest think we already have), or one can have ICBMs sitting in silos, waiting for the push of a button to incinerate a city (which the nuclear powers most certainly have). Take your pick.

The real issue is not whether India has the economic resources, but if it's wise to use them for acquiring a nuclear arsenal. But defence planning is not an either/or game. When China began its nuclear build-up in the 60s, its economic condition was worse than ours is today – and look where China is now! The financial energies of our country have just been released; with adequate guidance, developing a nuclear arsenal shouldn't pose much of a problem – despite the Rs 49.01 billion increase demanded by the defence ministry this year. In any case, with two acquisitive neighbours, do we have an option? India needs to guarantee its safety in a nuclearised world. The nuclear states have given us enough justifications on why they need to retain their nukes – and India has the very same security objectives.

When I wrote on the US developing a new nuclear weapon, the B61-11, one wit advised me to get current data on arms, saying that penetration weapons "are nothing new". True, they were developed a while ago – but not with nuclear warheads. The Sandia National Laboratories delivers this gem: "The B61-11 was authorised in August 1995 with a requested delivery date of Dec. 31, 1996… (It) will be an earth-penetrating weapon that will replace the aging B53 bomb… The retrofit will consist of repackaging the Los Alamos physics package and Sandia's arming, fuzing, and firing electronics into a new one-piece steel earth-penetrating center-case... We conducted 13 full-scale drop tests this year, three in Alaska and ten at the Tonopah Test Range." Get "information on weapons no longer in production"? Hahahaha… Sweetheart, what data is released is not old hat – it's just fait accompli. The point is, high tech nukes *were* being developed secretly by the US.

The B61-11 is the nuclear equivalent of a "dum-dum" bullet – i e, it penetrates and explodes, creating all the damage a nuclear bomb would, but without the dirty side-effects it would leave if detonated above ground. It would be more powerful than the closest thing there is to a nuclear-type conventional bomb – i e, the fuel-air bomb aka the "daisy cutter". It creates such a huge fireball that it sucks all the oxygen out of the air in the region, including the air out of the lungs of people who happen to be in the area. Pretty yummy.

Finally, the big question: "What could India lose if it dropped out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and built the bomb?" For starters, India has never signed the NPT, and building the bomb itself does not pose a serious problem – so long as it's kept secret. The problem lies with testing. If we test, we could face economic sanctions, UN condemnation, international isolation, the whole coercion-works. But with our growing economy, global interdependence and our vast market, eventually, isolation would prove futile: You may have noticed that the US has had limited success in isolating even Iran. My – go ahead, laugh – instinct says that India already has IRBMs deployed in silos – and never mind the House panel's April 30 direction to deploy Agni. The Big Five doth protest too much, unless we didn't already 'em.

I don't believe the next generation is going to take this pacifist crap being spouted by our own. Pacifism works if the opponent is playing by the same set of rules. Morality is fine as long as it serves national interests and is widely observed. But Matsyanyaya – law of the jungle – exists. A paper for Abolition of Nuclear Weapons says: "Today's treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the US and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a reversible nuclear potential." And Sandia says: "In FY96, Military Liaison trained more than 1,500 students, a 50 per cent increase over recent years due to the growing demand for nuclear weapons skills, knowledge, and qualification…" I say bring out the Arthashastra for reference.

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