The Rediff Special
The most stunning feature of the Sukhoi
acquisition is the absence of any operational
doctrine and deployment philosophy
At the last Farnborough Air Show, Pakistan air chief Abbas Khattack reportedly told his Indian counterpart Sareen, "You do not buy the Su-30, we will not purchase the Mirage 2000." Only last month, Khattack admitted that "the qualitative edge which we had before 1992 over India is eroding".
It is no secret that on April 1, 1996, only 16 of Pakistan's 40 F-16s were operational.
So why has the IAF gone in for the Su-30 and were there other options? Like in the case of the Bofors guns, the Sukhoi fighter has demonstrated that when the government has urgent interest in a weapons deal, it can persuade the service to be creative in threat perception and ASR construction to ensure a quick contract-cum-delivery of military hardware with adequate recoil.
The most stunning feature of the Sukhoi acquisition is the absence of any operational doctrine and deployment philosophy because there has been no change in the threat environment and hence no need for increased radius of action beyond 300 nautical miles to 1,500, and extend it to 5,000 nautical miles by air-to-air refuelling. Just because it is air-to-air refuel capable, everyone in the IAF is now talking about acquiring this facility, when both Jaguar and M-2000 were similarly endowed.
Clearly, there was no need for the Su-30. Instead, in view of the large gaps in low-level air defence as shown by Purulia and the Pakistani RPV and other instructions of air space, the air defence environment ought to have been beefed up and if more punch had to be added, the better option was to buy two squadrons of the advanced M 2000-5 and one of MiG-29. This would have been cheaper in the long run, ensured no new type and class of aircraft and the attendant logistics nightmare. The proponents of the Su-30 Mk1 shot down this option.
Over the past few years, we have already bought eight Mirages, 10 MiG-29, and 15 Jaguars to offset attrition, says a former air marshal. We could have bought a few more till the LCA came on the stream, he adds. It seems the IAF is its own worst enemy, painting new threats when the old ones have not changed.
The two-seater fighter in an American innovation for its F-111 and F-4 it requires a pilot in the front cockpit and a weapons system operator in the rear. Now, instead of the WSO we will have to fill in a second pilot.
The agent/middleman system is good for the services as it offers a single point of contact and interface with multinationals, argue the services. As far as the government's boast that there were no kickbacks, all one defence consultant in Delhi could say was: Eureka!
The other side of Sukhoi
- The IAF will suddenly jump from a single-seat 10-tonne combat aircraft to twin-seat 30-tonne class.
- Already short of fighter pilots, IAF will require twice as many pilots to fill the second seat.
- While procurement cost is Rs 63.1 billion , follow-up maintenance and infrastructure cost likely to be another Rs 70 billion.
- There are no hardened air defence shelters for this size of aircraft. Besides, no servicing and testing infrastructure is in place.
- Since the aircraft is not operational anywhere else in the world, not even in Russia, aspects of spares support are unknown.
- Russian pilots have flown a mere 155 sorties in 84 hours to give it an air-worthiness certificate.
- High rate of premature engine withdrawal and likely with low (150 hours) Time Before Overhaul.
- Midstream, the variant Su-30K for air defence being supplied now will be modified to the multi-role Su-30 Mkl over a 10-year period.
- When the Su-30K was demonstrated at Bangalore air show last year, eight extra engines were on hold to ensure it flew one sortie a day for six days.
- No guaranteed product support is ensured as was in the cause of the Jaguar (1978 to 2004).
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